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I. THE APPELLATE COURT'S JURISDICTION
This Court's jurisdiction is pursuant to The Utah Judicial Code, §§ 78A-4103(2)(a), (f) (2008), as well as Rules 3 and 4 of The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
as this appeal arises from a final order and judgment of a District Court and an order of
the District Court denying a petition for an extraordinary writ where Appellant1 is
incarcerated for a conviction of a Second Degree Felony.
II. THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
A. Issue One
1. The Issue; Evidence and testimony given at the evidentiary hearing and
incorporated into the record on Appellant's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
demonstrated by preponderance of the evidence that Petitioner/Appellant was entitled to
withdraw his plea of guilty as unknowingly and involuntarily entered where the trial
court failed to conduct an adequate colloquy with the Appellant in violation of
Appellant's due process rights.
2. Standard of review: "The question of "[w]hether the [district] court strictly complied
with rule 11 is a question of law, reviewed for correctness." State v. Corwell, 2005 UT 28,
^[10,114 P.3d 569,572. This non-deferential review for correctness is triggered when
interpretation of the sentencing-court conduct implicates the "ultimate question" of
compliance with the constitutional and procedural requirements for the entry of a plea. See
State v. Beckstead, 2006 UT 42, fl2,140 P.3d 1288,1291.
1

Also referred to herein as "Mr. Peterson."
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In addition, interpretation of the Post-Conviction Remedies Act and Rule 65C
"present[ ] question[s] of law, which we also review for correctness and without
deference to the lower court's conclusion." Manning v. State, 2004 UT App 87, f8; 89
P.3d 196, 202; accord Moench v. State, 2002 UT App 333, f 4, 57 P.3d 1116, 1118.
"Generally, an appeal from a judgment on a petition for post-conviction relief raises
questions of law reviewed for correctness, [on which we give] no deference to the postconviction court's conclusion." Manning, at 200 (quoting Wickham v. Galetka, 2002 UT
72,f 7, 61 P.3d 978). "We review an appeal from an order dismissing or denying a
petition for post-conviction relief for correctness without deference to the lower court's
conclusions of law." Id. (quoting Rudolph v. Galetka, 2002 UT 7,f 4, 43 P.3d 467 (citing
Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249, 252 (Utah 1998)).
3. Supporting Authority: Bluemel v. State, 2006 UT App 141, <H1 1,13,134 P.3d
at 185-6 (referring to Utah R.Crim. P. 11(e)). State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309,1313 (Utah
1987) (noting federal due process concerns with court's failure to ensure defendant
understands what he is admitting to by entering the plea, as set forth in Henderson v.
Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645,96 S.Q. 2253, 2257,49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976)); State v.
Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 444 (Utah 1983) (stating court's ensuring defendant's voluntariness
and knowingness in entering plea protect defendant's due process rights under Utah Const,
art. I, §7).
B. Issue Two

1. The Issue; Evidence and testimony given at the evidentiary hearing and
incorporated into the record on Appellant's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
demonstrated by preponderance of the evidence that Petitioner/Appellant was entitled to
withdraw his plea of guilty as unknowingly and involuntarily entered where he was
provided ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of Appellant's due process rights.
Former counsel coerced Appellant to plead guilty against his will and without ensuring
he was competent to enter the plea, failed to take an active role in the proceedings against
Appellant, held an adversarial relationship with Appellant, and had an actual conflict of
interest while representing Appellant.
2. Standard of review; Whether habeas corpus petitioner was accorded right of
counsel and was properly advised as to consequences of his plea of guilty in criminal trial
are questions of fact. Brown v. Turner, 1968, 21 Utah 2d 96, 440 P.2d 968. When
reviewing the denial of a petition for relief under the PCRA, '"we will set aside the
district court's findings of fact only if they are clearly erroneous, and we review its
conclusions of law for correctness.'" Thomas v. State, 2002 UT 128,14, 63 P.3d 672
(quoting Seel v. Van Der Veur, 971 P.2d 924, 926 (Utah 1998)).
3. Supporting Authority: The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence." U.S. Const, amend. VI. The Supreme Court has based this right as stemming from
defense counsel's critical role in the "ability of the adversarial system to produce just
results." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,685,104 S.Ct. 2052, 2063, 80 L.Ed.2d 674

3

(1984). The right to effective assistance of counsel "includes the right to counsel free from
conflicts of interest." State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65,72 (Utah App.1990) (citing Strickland, 466
U.S. at 688,104 S.Ct. at 2065). In Strickland, the Court established a test where a defendant
is required to show (1) deficient performance by counsel, and (2) prejudice to the defense. Id.
466 U.S. at 687,104 S.Ct. at 2064; see also State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182,186-7 (Utah
1991) (adopting two-prong Strickland test).
However, in another case, decided on the same date as Strickland, the Supreme Court
created an exception to the second requirement of showing prejudice when the deficient
performance of counsel is particularly egregious. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648,
658,104 S.Ct. 2039, 2046, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984), cited in Stano v. Dugger, 921 F.2d 1125,
1152 (11th Cir.1991) (en banc) ("[T]he Supreme Court created an exception to the Strickland
standard for ineffective assistance of counsel and acknowledged that certain circumstances
are so egregiously prejudicial that ineffective assistance of counsel will be presumed").
"Cronic presumes prejudice where there has been an actual breakdown in the adversarial
process at trial." Toomey v. Bunnell, 898 F.2d lA\,lAAn.2

(9th Cir.).

The existence of actual conflict of interest by former defense counsel can invoke the
exception to Strickland's prejudice showing on appeal or by way of a habeas corpus petition
if the defendant demonstrates "that 'an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his
lawyer's performance.'" State v. Brandley, 972 P.2d 78, 85 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State
v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 686 (Utah 1997) (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348, 100
S.Ct. 1708,1718,64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980))).
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III. PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE BELOW
Petitioner/Appellant preserved the issues for this appeal by presenting these issues
to the Trial Court below. The issues listed herein were presented in a sufficiently clear
manner to the Trial Court, in counsel's oral arguments and evidence presented at the
evidentiary hearing, such that the judges of Appellant's underlying matter had a clear
opportunity to rule on each issue presented. The Trial Court then issued its final Order
from which this Appeal is taken.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS DETERMINATIVE OF APPEAL
While this is not a Constitutional case, per se, the Due Process Clause, as applied
by the Fourteenth Amendment to The United States Constitution, is an underlying
authority for determining this appeal.
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal is from a final order of the Second Judicial District Court denying
Appellant's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief that was based on a criminal matter
resulting in a conviction of Sexual Abuse of Minor, under Utah Stat. Ann. § 76-5-401.1,
amended to a Second Degree Felony. Appellant did not enter his plea of guilty to sexual
abuse of a minor voluntarily or with intelligence. He was not competent to proceed much
less to enter a plea. He is mentally retarded, borderline at the least, with a history of bipolar and severe clinical depression.
A.

Statement of Material Facts

1) Procedural History of Criminal Case No. 041902251 and the Instant Case

5

On April 22, 2004, the State of Utah charged Petitioner with one count of
"Aggravated Sexual Abuse of a Child," a lst-degree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 765-404.1(3) (2003), for events alleged to have occurred between September 2003 and
March 2004. This case was filed as No. 041902251. On November 1, 2005, the day trial
was set for, Petitioner appeared before District Judge P.G. Heffernan and entered a plea
of "no contest" to one count of "Sexual Abuse of a Minor," a 2d-degree felony. John
Caine ("Caine") and Grant W. P. Morrison ("Morrison") served as counsel retained by
Petitioner.
On January 10, 2006, Petitioner was sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less
than one year and not more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. This prison term
was suspended where Petitioner was to serve one year in jail, with work release if
possible, and put on probation for 36 months. The conditions of his probation included
entering an agreement with AP&P and compliance therewith, no committing violations of
the law, being released to NUCCC when a bed space becomes available and successfully
completing that program, complying with all Group "A" sex offender conditions, and
having no contact with the victim or her family.
On April 18, 2006, Judge Pamela Heffernan revoked Petitioner's probation and
reinstated his stayed sentence of one to fifteen years to be served in Utah State Prison.
Hence, Petitioner is currently incarcerated in the Central Utah Correctional Facility, in
Gunnison, Utah.
On or about November 17, 2006, Appellant filed a Petition for Post-Conviction

6

Relief. On November 26, 2007, an evidentiary took place where testimony and evidence
was admitted in addition to the incorporation of Appellant's Petition for Post-Conviction
Relief and exhibits as part of the record. On December 17, 2007, the parties submitted
written closing arguments and proposed findings of fact and law. On or about January 22,
2008, Judge Pamela Heffernan issued a final order denying Appellant's Petition on all
claims.
2) Statement of Material Facts2
I) FIRST CLAIM - Petitioner's Conviction Should be Reversed Because the Trial
Court Did Not Adequately Ensure Petitioner Was Entering the Plea Voluntarily and
Knowingly as Required under Utah R.Crim. P. Rule 11 and the Due Process Clause
of the U.S. Constitution and Utah Const. Art. I, § 7.
1.

Petitioner petitions this court for relief from the conviction resulting from that plea.

2.

After Petitioner was first charged in 2004, he retained Grant Morrison for his defense.

Morrison brought in John Caine as a "consultant" for Petitioner's defense. This was despite
Petitioner's objections where Caine had successfully represented the woman, Jeri Daines,
accused of the first-degree murder of Petitioner's three-month-old son, Clancy Peterson, in
2001. Petitioner had experienced long-term depression after his son's homicide and desired
that the attorney who exonerated his son's alleged murderer would have no part in his own
2

These facts are gleaned from the evidence admitted at the evidentiary hearing, which
took place on November 26, 2007, and the transcript of which has been provided.
Included at that evidentiary hearing, J. Heffernan incorporated into the record the
Appellant's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and all of its exhibits as part of the
record. Appellant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of his Petition for
Post-Conviction Relief cites with particularity to each tabbed exhibit that was attached
thereto. The facts cited hereon are gleaned directly from all of this evidence admitted into
the record.
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defense. When Petitioner's mother and Petitioner brought up their concern to Morrison of
Caine's representing Petitioner, Morrison said it was no problem and dismissed the issue as
irrelevant. Morrison insisted that Caine's representation presented no possible conflicts of
interest, and Caine advised Petitioner or appeared on his behalf in many instances.
3.

In the course of Petitioner's defense, Caine made statements indicating he thought

that Petitioner was "stupid." At one point, Caine angrily told Petitioner that he had
embarrassed Caine and ruined his reputation where Caine had been representing Petitioner as
if Petitioner were innocent. Morrison remarked haughtily several times that Petitioner was
too slow mentally to understand many procedures and treated Petitioner as if he were too
stupid to understand his advice. Before the plea hearing, Petitioner's defense attorney
Morrison treated him impatiently as if he were tired of explaining things. Right after
Petitioner had entered his plea on this case on May 24, 2006, Morrison stated that he doubted
Petitioner was mentally capable of understanding the proceedings in court. Petitioner
suffers from psychological disorders which have variously been diagnosed as anxiety
disorder, depressive disorder, unspecified learning disorder, and attention-deficit disorder,
many stemming from the loss of his son in 2001. Due to their impatience with Petitioner's
slow comprehension, Petitioner's defense counsel failed to take adequate time to explain his
plea statement and prior stipulation of dismissal to him.
4.

Neither counsel ever told Petitioner he had a good chance of acquittal before they

pressured him to plead guilty. Yet Caine conceded in open court that good chance of
acquittal in this case: "[V]ery frankly, there were issues that could have been tried in both
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[Weber and Davis County] cases that could have arisen in an acquittal. And the State knew
that, and we knew that."
5.

Neither counsel sought Petitioner's informed consent to agree to the stipulation of

dismissal wherein it mandated that Petitioner later plead guilty to a crime he had consistently
denied committing to counsel. By the time of Petitioner's plea hearing defense counsel
simply advised Petitioner what to say in court.
6.

Petitioner wished to have a trial in the, particularly because he maintained he was not

guilty of sexual abuse of a minor or of lewdness involving a child. He entered a guilty plea
with the misunderstanding that he was not admitting to the crime charged. In fact, his plea
statement did admit to the facts of the crime. Had Mr. Peterson understood this, he
would not have pled no-contest because he maintains to this day that he did not commit
the crime.
7.

During Petitioner's plea colloquy before Judge Pamela Heffernan, the court relied

heavily on Petitioner's "Statement of Petitioner in Support of Guilty Plea" to apprise it of the
voluntariness of the plea and to enter into the record Petitioner's understanding of the
constitutional rights he was waiving, his right to move to withdraw his plea, and the other
elements of Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. The court did not verbally
inquire into me elements enumerated in Rule 11. When asked whether Petitioner
understood his plea statement at first Petitioner expressed difficulty understanding his plea.
The court inquired of defense counsel what had been done to help him understand, to which
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Caine replied he had read the statement to Petitioner "verbatim." Only at this point did
Petitioner state that he had understood the plea statement.
8.

Although the "Statement of Petitioner in Support of Guilty Plea" contends that

Petitioner supposedly admitted to touching a "child under the age of 14 on the vaginal
area for purposes of gratifying a sexual desire" yet at the plea hearing the "factual basis"
was devoid of sexual intent: "[T]he allegation of the victim is that he picked her up,
placed her on his lap, put his hand down the front of her pants on the bare skin, and
touched her genitals." Any admission to the "allegation" is also wholly absent at the
hearing. It is no small wonder that Petitioner did not know he was admitting to the factual
elements of "Sexual Abuse of a Child."
9.

The bulk of the colloquy was actually conducted with Petitioner's defense

counsel, Caine. The court relied on the assertions of defense counsel that Petitioner
understood the plea statement because it had allegedly been read to him "verbatim"
despite uncertainties raised in the course of the plea colloquy. The court did not clarify
Petitioner's counsel's contradictions and ambiguities when counsel was assuring the
court the entire plea statement had been read to Petitioner. Although Caine conceded
when he went over the plea agreement with Petitioner "the [plea] statement wasn't there,"
he had read it "Une for line" to Petitioner. In fact, Caine had not read the plea agreement
"verbatim" to Petitioner but had only gone over the "basics" of it.
10.

Petitioner only stated to the court that he understood the plea statement because he

was intimidated by the court proceedings he did not understand, by his attorney's
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admonitions that he was too stupid to understand, and by the fact he did not want to
embarrass his attorney by contradicting counsel's having said he read the plea statement to
Petitioner "verbatim" when he did not.
11.

Furthermore, the trial court failed to carry its burden of ensuring that Petitioner

understood his time-limited right to appeal or withdraw his plea under Rule 11 's strict
compliance requirement. The court never asked Petitioner whether he understood his
appeal rights. The court mentioned to Petitioner that he had a right to jury trial, to cross
examination of witnesses against him, to be present at trial, not to testify himself, and to
presumed innocence until proven guilty.
12.

The court then indicated it would go over all of his rights but that it would not be

necessary to "go[] over it and over it and over it unless I need to." Such an offering
would not be welcome to many, much less a defendant who is already visibly intimidated
by his attorney and the whole process such that Caine answered in Petitioner's stead half
of the questions posed to Petitioner by the court.
13.

Hence, the court failed to adequately incorporate the plea statement into the record

by showing Petitioner had thoroughly understood it. The trial court simply relied on
representations by defense counsel that Petitioner understood the plea statement.
14.

Due to his psychological condition, Petitioner had difficulties understanding the

proceedings, the consequences of his plea, and the nature of his constitutional rights. The
trial court failed to evince any further evidence that Petitioner understood his guilty plea.
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II) SECOND CLAIM - Petitioner's Sixth Amendment Right to Effective Assistance
of Counsel Was Violated Where His Defense Counsel Caine's Loyalties Were
Divided and He Did Not Act as an Effective Advocate to Ensure a Fair Adversarial
Proceeding
A. An Actual Conflict of Interest Existed Where Petitioner's Trial Counsel Caine
Had Divided Loyalties between a Former Client and Petitioner
15.

Caine's former successful defense of the woman accused to Petitioner's 3-month-old

son became a problem in the course of his representation of Petitioner. When representing
Petitioner Caine exhibited divided loyalty to his own reputation and his former client he had
successfully defended in 2001. Daines was the owner and operator of the daycare where
Petitioner's 3-month-old son Clancy was shaken to death. In essence, as the parents of the
minor victim, Boyd and Natalie Peterson were represented by the State in that case in
prosecuting their son's death. Caine represented the defendant Daines.
16.

Caine had publicly stated he believed in Jeri Daines' innocence. Yet Petitioner

wanted to testify as to how her harmful or negligent behavior toward his son affected his
mind and attitude toward children. Petitioner, his family, and those who knew him in the
community wanted to testify to Petitioner's reputation in the community and how through
Jeri Daines' act or negligence to act to protect his son Petitioner was seen to have softened
even more toward children and became more protective of them. Such testimony would have
been oppositional and embarrassing to Caine who had vigorously defended Daines'
innocence. An actual conflict of interest that adversely affected Caine's performance also
exists where Caine had a divided loyalty to his former client, Jeri Daines, such that
Caine's divided loyalty adversely affected Caine's performance where Caine could not
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have raised or avoided raising 1) a legitimate argument of Petitioner's incapacity to hurt a
child, or 2) an affirmative defense of Petitioner's mental state.
17.

Such testimony would have been oppositional and embarrassing to Caine who had

vigorously defended Daines' innocence. "That case I'm very proud of.... Jeri Daines
wasn't just not guilty, she was innocent." Caine had an actual conflict from putting
Petitioner on the stand because Petitioner would have testified about his pain toward
mistreatment of children due to the pain he suffered from Jeri Daines' having negligently
killed his son. This would have been a legitimate argument for Caine to take with
Petitioner, but he made the choice not to go that way, even saying to Petitioner that he
would never put him on the stand because he is too "stupid" and would not say the "right
things." Instead, Caine convinced Petitioner to take a plea to avoid the embarrassment
that Petitioner's testimony would have caused Caine and the threat it would have posed to
his loyalty to his former client, whose innocence Caine believed in.
18.

Caine and Morrison pressured and coerced Petitioner to take a plea despite the wishes

of Petitioner and his family to testify about the effect of Clancy's murder on Petitioner and
how the abusive and neglectful actions of Caine's former client, Jeri Daines, rendered
Appellant more sensitive to the harm that can come to a child than ever before; despite
Petitioner's good chance for acquittal; despite Petitioner's repeated assertion of innocence
concerning the underlying charges; despite Petitioner's repeatedly expressing difficulty in
understanding counsels' advice; and explanations of the legal procedures and consequences.
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B. Caine's Failure to Counsel Petitioner of His Option of Going to Trial with the
Insanity or Mental Infirmity Defense Was Due to His Divided Loyalty and Thus
Constitutes Presumed Conflict of Interest which is Prima Facia Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel
19.

Caine had to make the choice not to counsel Petitioner of his option to raise the

defense of mental illness. This defense of mental illness or diminished capacity would have
been based on Petitioner's severe clinically diagnosed depression stenaming from the death
of his son that he felt was caused by the negligence of Caine's former client, Jeri Daines.
Caine would not bring up the effects of Petitioner's severe depression as it was relevant to
Petitioner's criminal responsibility. This was so because Petitioner's depression stemmed
originally from what Petitioner construed as the murder of his son by Caine's former client,
whose innocence Caine believed in.
C. Caine's Coercion of Petitioner Constituted an Actual Conflict of Interest that
Adversely Affected Counsel's Performance and Was Hence Presumed Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel
20.

Where Caine coerced Petitioner to accept a plea by misleading Petitioner of his

chances of acquittal, and subjected Petitioner to persuasion and influence such that the
Petitioner's will was overborne, the plea is not only unknowingly and involuntarily
entered and Caine's behavior exhibited a clear and actual conflict of interest. Hence,
where a plea is entered based on trial counsel's interests that are oppositional to
defendant's, based on coercion and false promises by trial counsel to defendant, under
circumstances of severe emotional distress and duress of the defendant, and where trial
counsel knew or should have known his client mentally and emotionally was highly
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susceptible to counsel's advise, conflict of interest is presumed.
21.

Caine coerced Petitioner to enter a plea of guilty although Petitioner continued to

deny he committed the crimes he was charged with and Caine conceded in open court
that this case as well as the Davis County case could have resulted in acquittals. "[V]ery
frankly, there were issues that could have been tried in both cases that could have arisen
in an acquittal. And the State knew that, and we knew that." Although Caine concluded
there was a good chance of acquittal, Caine urged Petitioner to enter a plea of no contest
by promising him he would "go home sooner."
22.

Caine took advantage of Petitioner's vulnerable state of mind, mental illness, and

low IQ by exerting his will over Petitioner. Caine did not adequately explain to Petitioner
that by pleading no contest he was confessing to the factual elements of sexual abuse of
the alleged victim. Petitioner was visibly intimidated by Caine. Evidence of Caine's
dominating and coercive behavior toward Petitioner in regard to Petitioner's plea can be
found at the change of plea hearing on November 1, 2005, where Petitioner was clearly
too intimidated to speak without Caine's prompting him and where Caine answered in
Petitioner's stead half of the questions posed to Petitioner by the court.
23.

Caine held an adversarial relationship with Petitioner. In the course of this case,

Caine repeatedly charged Petitioner with being "stupid." Caine refused to allow
Petitioner to take the stand, telling him he should plead out because he was too "stupid"
to take the stand and would not say the "right things." Caine angrily told Petitioner that
he had embarrassed him and ruined his reputation where Caine had been representing
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Petitioner as if he were innocent.
24.

Further evidence of Caine's animosity toward Petitioner is present on the record at

the probation revocation hearing. Although Caine conceded that all interested parties
present as well as the court had listened to the tape of Petitioner's call to his niece, Caine
felt compelled to represent the State's interests and view by characterizing for the court
that the call was "the most colossally stupid thing that Petitioner could have done
VI.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Appellant will demonstrate in this appeal that his plea was involuntarily entered
where the plea colloquy was insufficient. The Trial Court's acceptance of Appellant's
plea, which he unwillingly and unintelligently entered, was in violation of Rule 11 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Appellant will also demonstrate that as a matter of fact and law his plea was
unwillingly entered due to his attorney's conflict of interest and due to coercion by his
attorneys to enter the plea. Appellants defense attorney, John Caine, had a conflict of
interest that rendered his assistance to Appellant ineffective. Caine pressured Appellant
repeatedly knowing that Appellant was emotionally and mentally vulnerable and that if
Appellant went to trial eh would want to put his character at issue. By putting his
character at issue, Appellant would have to bring up the abuse that Caine's former client
caused Appellant and how that has made Appellant even more sensitive than ever to
children. For that reason, and for the other foregoing reasons, Mr. Peterson respectfully
requests that the Trial Court's Order denying his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief be
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reversed where the law, along with the facts, as admitted, supports a holding that Mr.
Peterson did not enter his plea intelligently and voluntarily.
VII. ARGUMENT
A. FIRST CLAIM
1. Peterson's Conviction Should be Reversed Because the Trial Court Did Not
Adequately Ensure Peterson Was Entering the Plea Voluntarily and
Knowingly as Required under Utah R.Crim. P. Rule 11 and the Due Process
Clause of the U.S. Constitution and Utah Const. Art. I, § 7.
A defendant's conviction should be reversed where the defendant believed his nocontest plea would not amount to an admission to the elements of the crime, the
prosecution did not meet its burden of proving each of those elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, and the trial court never explained his time-limited right to withdraw
the plea and appeal. To satisfy due process rights and Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, a trial court must adequately ensure by way of colloquy with the
defendant that he voluntarily and knowingly understands all rights waived and retained
under Rule 11(e). Bluemel v. State, UT App, ffl 11, 13, 134 P.3d at 185-6 (referring to
Utah R.Crim. P. 11(e)). To ensure compliance with a defendant's due process rights the
Utah Supreme Court has held that trial courts must strictly comply with Rule 11(e)'s
elements. See State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1313 (Utah 1987) (noting federal due
process concerns with court's failure to ensure defendant understands what he is
admitting to by entering the plea, as set forth in Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637,
645, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 2257,49 L.Ed.2d 108(1976)); State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 444
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(Utah 1983) (stating court's ensuring defendant's voluntariness and knowingness in
entering plea protect defendant's due process rights under Utah Const, art. I, § 7).
"The question of "[w]hether the [district] court strictly complied with rule 11 is a
question of law, reviewed for correctness." State v. Corwell, 2005 UT 28,110, 114 P.3d
569, 572. This nondeferential review for correctness is triggered when interpretation of
the sentencing-court conduct implicates the "ultimate question" of compliance with the
constitutional and procedural requirements for the entry of a plea. See State v.
Beckstead, 2006 UT 42, f 12, 140 P.3d 1288, 1291.
a) The District Court Failed to Strictly Comply with Rule 11(e) 's Factors
Because of Its Insufficient Colloquy with Peterson and Inadequate
Incorporation of the Plea Agreement into the Record
A court may strictly comply with Rule 11(e) criteria and still avoid going over the
plea statement verbatim with the defendant only under certain circumstances. First, the
statement must be "properly incorporated in the record' whereby "the trial judge
ascertains in the plea colloquy that the defendant has read, has understood and
acknowledges all the information contained therein." Bluemel v. State, 2006 UT App
141,114, 134, P.3d at 185-6 (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 216,
217 (Utah 1991). Second, during the colloquy any "omissions or ambiguities in the
[statement] must be clarified during the plea hearing, as must any uncertainties raised in
the course of the plea colloquy." Id. at fl5 (quoting State v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470, 477
Utah Ct. App. 1991); see also State v. Mora, 2003 UT App 117 f 19, 69 P.3d 838, 842
(reversing conviction where defendant did not adequately acknowledge plea affidavit,
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and verbal colloquy did not fully satisfy U. R.Crim.P. 11). Hence, the defendant's
comprehension of the plea statement notwithstanding, the court must "meaningfully
engage" the defendant to ascertain on the record his voluntariness and understanding of
the Rule 11(e) factors. See State v. Beckstead, 2006 UT 42, <f 16, 140 P.3d 1288, 1292
("Over time we have made clear that a sentencing judge must communicate to a
defendant the full complement of information found in rule 11 concerning the rights he
is relinquishing by pleading guilty").
In State v. Maguire, the Utah Court of Appeals clarified the rule for ensuring a
plea is entered knowing and voluntarily under Gibbon's strict compliance test. 830 P.2d
216, 218 (Utah 1992), rejecting State v. Dastrup, 818 P.2d 594, 596-99 (Utah Ct. App.
1991) (mistakenly interpreting Hojfs3 ^re-Gibbons application of Rule 11 "in the
record" requirement to mean only the transcript of the oral plea colloquy so that "the
trial court must base its findings solely on the colloquy, without considering any
statements made in the affidavit").
"Rule 11 requires the trial court to find that seven [now eight] detailed and
specific criteria have been fulfilled. Utah R.Crim.P. 1 l(5)(a)-(g) [now
1 l(e)(l)-(8)]. The record before an appellate court must contain a basis for
such findings, but that record may reflect such a basis by multiple means,
e.g., transcript of the oral colloquy between the court and defendant,
contents of a written affidavit that the record reflects was read, understood,
and acknowledged by defendant and the court, contents of other documents
such as the information, presentence reports, exhibits, etc., similarly
incorporated into the record....[T]he record may include the contents of
(such ) documents [only] where they have been properly incorporated and it

3

See State v. Hoff, 814 P.2d 1119,1122 (Utah 1991).
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is clear that they are indeed part of the defendant's knowledge and
understanding."
Id. To incorporate the plea statement into the record by establishing the
defendant's understanding of the Rule 119e) criteria in said statement a trial court must
elicit sufficient response from a defendant personally in the colloquy and cannot rely too
much upon the defense attorney's certifying that he or she thoroughly explained and
counseled the defendant of his Rule 11(e) rights and admissions. "The practice of simply
relying on defense attorneys and plea affidavits to explain the waiver of constitutional
rights and to determine that a guilty plea was knowing and voluntary in every significant
respect was deemed insufficient [by Gibbons], and that burden was placed on the judge."
State v. Hoff, 814 P.2d 1119, 1122 (Utah 1991) (citing State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309,
1312). The United States Supreme Court has long established that the colloquy must be
with the defendant, not the defense attorney.
"UJt is too late in the day to permit a guilty plea to be entered against a
defendant solely on the consent of the defendant's agent [—] his lawyer.
Our cases make absolutely clear that the choice to plead guilty must be the
defendant's; it is he who must be informed of the consequences of his plea
and what it is that he waives when he pleads, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S.
238, [89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274] (1969); and it is on his admission that
he is in fact guilty that his conviction will rest. Id. at 650, 96 S.Ct. at 2260.
Because of the importance of compliance with Rule 11(e) and Boykin, the
law places the burden of establishing compliance with those requirements
on the trial judge. It is not sufficient to assume that defense attorneys make
sure that their clients fully understand the contents of the affidavit."

Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1313 n. 4 (quoting Henderson, 426 U.S. 637, 650, 96
S.Ct. 2253, 2260, 49 L.Ed.2d 10 (1976) (j- White, concurring). Hence, the trial judge can
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only rely on the plea statement as evidence of 1) a defendant's understanding of a plea
agreement and 2) a defendant's voluntarily entering such a plea once the statement is
properly incorporated into the record by way of an adequate colloquy between the judge
and the defendant.
i.

Rule 11 (e)(2) and 11 (e)(4)(A)-(B) Was Not Established on
the Record Sufficiently to Ensure Peterson's Understanding
and Voluntariness of Entering a Plea of No Contest or Guilty

One important element of Rule 11(e) goes to the defendant's understanding of the
factual basis for entering the plea. "The court has an undoubted duty to guard against
the possibility that an accused who is innocent of the crime charged may be induced to
plead guilty without sufficient understanding of the nature of the charge or the
consequences of his plea...." State v. Harris, 585 P.2d 450, 452 (Utah 1978). In
applying the Rule 11(e) strict compliance analysis, the factual elements of the charges
against the defendant must be explained in taking the guilty plea so that the defendant
understands and admits those elements. See State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1313
(Utah 1987) (citing McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 89 S.Q. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d
418 (1969) (applying the analogous Rule 11 of Fed. R. Crim.P). "There is no adequate
substitute for demonstrating in the record at the time the plea is entered the defendant's
understanding of the nature of the charge against him." McCarthy, at 466, 467, 470, 89
S.Ct. at 1170, 1171, 1172 (citations omitted, footnotes omitted, emphasis in the
original). "The judge must determine 'that the conduct which the defendant admits
constitutes the offense charged in the indictment or information or an offense included
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therein to which the defendant has pleaded guilty." Id. at 1313 (quoting McCarthy, at
470).
Hence, applying Utah's Rule 11(e)(4)4, a conviction based on a plea of guilty
cannot stand if there is no record of facts showing that the charged crime was actually
committed by the defendant or that the prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a
substantial risk of conviction. See e.g., State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 442-44 (Utah
1983) (referring to U. R. Crim. P. 11 (e)(2)'s voluntariness requirement and Rule
11(e)(4)). In Breckenridge, in the course of the colloquy the court explained the
elements of the crime of arson, to which Breckenridge was charged and pleading guilty
to, and asked if Breckenridge agreed he was guilty of those elements. Id. at 442.
Although Breckenridge stated he was guilty of those elements, upon the court's request
that he recount the act of arson he committed, Breckemidge's narrative revealed an
absence of the necessary element of intent. 688 P.2d at 442. Hence, "[b]ecause
Breckenridge's guilty plea was involuntarily made," the court held "that the judgment of
conviction was entered without due process of law in violation of Utah Const, art. I, §
1... and "must therefore be vacated and the plea set aside." Id. at 444. See also
4

It must be established that the defendant understands the "nature and elements of the
offense to which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is
an admission of all those elements." Utah R. Crim.P. 11(e)(4)(A). Rule 11(e)(4)(B)
requires there be a sufficient factual basis for the plea where it must establish "that the
charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or, if the defendant refuses or is
otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution has sufficient evidence to
establish a substantial risk of conviction." Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(4)(B).
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Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 2257-58 (holding plea cannot
be constitutionally voluntary if defendant has such incomplete understanding of charge
that his plea cannot stand as intelligent admission of guilt where receiving "real notice of
the true nature of the charge against him [is the first and most universally recognized
requirement of due process") (citations omitted).
ii.

Rule 11 (e)(7)-(8) Was Not Established on the Record
Sufficiently to Ensure Peterson's Understanding and
Voluntariness of Entering of Plea of No Contest or Guilty

The trial court carries the burden of specifically ensuring that the defendant
understood his time-limited right to appeal or withdraw his plea under Rule 11' s strict
compliance requirement. See Rule 1 l(e)(7)-(8). Comparably, the Bluemel trial court
relied upon the defendant's plea affidavit to ensure Ms. Bluemel understood the
constitutional rights she waived by pleading guilty. 2006 UT App 141, f 18, 134 P.3d
186, 187. The Utah Court of Appeals ruled the trial court's "critical error" was in failing
to assure itself of Ms. Bluemel's understanding of those constitutional rights, beyond
Ms. Bluemel's acknowledgement in her plea affidavit. Id., 11 15. The court did not
properly incorporate the plea statement into the record where during the plea colloquy it
only asked the defendant if she had "any questions about the statement." Id. at f 15.
Because the trial court "failed to inform Bluemel of all of the rule 11(e) factors and
rights," the Utah Court of Appeals held the plea statement was not properly incorporated
into the record, and that the trial court did not sufficiently conduct a rule 11 colloquy.
Id. atf 16 (emphasis added).
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Rule 1 l(e)(7)-8 are two of the eight important factors a court must establish on the
record that the defendant understands. That is, before accepting a plea of no-contest or
guilty, a court must find that "the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing
any motion to withdraw the plea; and the defendant has been advised that the right of
appeal is limited." Utah R. Crim. P. ll(e)(7)-(8).
B. SECOND CLAIM
1. Peterson's Sixth Amendment Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel
Was Violated Where His Defense Counsel Caine's Loyalties Were
Divided and He Did Not Act as an Effective Advocate to Ensure a Fair
Adversarial Proceeding
In the instant case, the Sixth Amendment's right to effective assistance of counsel
was prima facie violated where a conflict of interest is presumed. It was also violated
when defense counsel assisted the prosecution and did not act as an effective advocate to
ensure a just adversarial proceeding. The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right...to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defense." U.S. Const, amend. VI. The Supreme Court has based this
right as stemming from defense counsel's critical role in the "ability of the adversarial
system to produce just results." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685, 104 S.Ct.
2052, 2063, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The right to effective assistance of counsel
"includes the right to counsel free from conflicts of interest." State v. Webb, 790 P.2d
65, 72 (Utah App. 1990) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2065). In
Strickland, the Court established a test where a defendant is required to show (1)
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deficient performance by counsel, and (2) prejudice to the defense. Id. 466 U.S. at 687,
104 S.Ct. at 2064; see also State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186-7 (Utah 1991) (adopting
two-prong Strickland test).
However, in another case, decided on the same date as Strickland, the Supreme
Court created an exception to the second requirement of showing prejudice when the
deficient performance of counsel is particularly egregious. See United States v. Cronic,
466 U.S. 648, 658, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 2046, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984), cited in Stano v.
Dugger, 921 F.2d 1125, 1152 (111th Cir. 1991) (en banc) ("[T]he Supreme Court created
an exception to the Strickland standard for ineffective assistance of counsel and
acknowledged that certain circumstances are so egregiously prejudicial that ineffective
assistance of counsel will be presumed"). "Cronic presumes prejudice where there has
been an actual breakdown in the adversarial process at trial." Toomey v. Bunnell, 898
F.2d 741, 744 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1990).
The presence of a conflict of interest for the defense counsel can invoke this
exception. "[A] sixth amendment claim grounded on conflict of interest is a special
subtype of ineffectiveness claim, which must be examined under a somewhat different
standard that was first enunciated in pre-Strickland cases." State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65,
71. The "adversarial process protected by the Sixth Amendment requires that the
accused have 'counsel acting in the role of an advocate.'" Cronic, 466 U.S. at 655, 104
S.Ct. at 2045 (citing Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 743, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 1399, 18
L.Ed.2d 493 (1967)). Thus, the right to the effective assistance of counsel is the right of
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the accused to require the prosecution's case to survive the "crucible of meaningful
adversarial testing." United States v. Swanson, 943 F.2d 1070, 1072 (9th Cir. 1991).
a) An Actual Conflict of Interest Existed Where Peterson's Trial Counsel
Caine Had Divided Loyalties between a Former Client and Peterson

The presence of a conflict of interest for the defense counsel can invoke the
exception to Stickland's prejudice showing on appeal by way of a habeas corpus petition
if the defendant demonstrates "that 'an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his
lawyer's performance.'" State v. Brandley, 972 P.2d 78, 85 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting
State v. Taylor, P.2d 681, 686 (Utah 1997) (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335,
348, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1718, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980))). To establish an actual conflict of
interest, defendants must show that due to trial counsel's divided loyalty he or she "was
required to make a choice advancing his own interests to the detriment of his client's
interests." Taylor, 947 P.2d at 686 (citations omitted). Petitioner has the burden of
demonstrating with specificity that the actual conflict existed and adversely affected
[trial counsel's] performance." Id; see also State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 488 (Utah
App. 1991). "If the defendant makes such a showing of [actual conflict], prejudice need
not be demonstrated to prevail on the claim," rather it will be presumed that the
defendant was prejudiced by the lawyer's performance. State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484,
488 (Utah App. 1991) (citing Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 2046; Cuyler,
446 U.S. at 349-50, 100 S.Ct. at 1718-19; Webb, 790 P.2d at 73). Furthermore,
"[d]efense counsel have an ethical obligation to avoid conflicting representation and to
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advise the court promptly when a conflict of interest arises during the course of trial."
State v. Webb, 790 P. 2d 65, 72 (Utah App. 1990).
b) Caine's Failure to Counsel Peterson of His Option of Going to Trial
with the Insanity or Mental Infirmity Defense Was Due to His Divided
Loyalty and Thus Constitutes Presumed Conflict of Interest which is
Prima Facie Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Conflicts of interest involving an attorney's divided loyalties do not always trigger
applications of local rules of professional conduct. The Utah Court of Appeals reasoned
that although "Counsel's conduct may be examined in light of prevailing professional and
ethical standards to determine whether defendant received effective representation,"
violation of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct provides but one possible way for
courts to augment legal principles involving lawyer conduct. State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d
484,489.
In Johnson, the Utah Court of Appeals found an actual conflict of interest that
would have adversely affected counsel's performance where evidence by State existed
that the defense counsel had substantial knowledge of, and had participated in, one of the
transactions that formed the basis of charges against the defendant. Id. Thus, trial
counsel had interest (in exonerating himself) that was not consistent with defending his
client. Id. What is more, counsel's integrity and credibility personally, and as defense
counsel, were eroded by accusations, making him less effective in representing
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defendant. Id. at 490. Applying Rule 1.7(b)5, the court stated that an actual conflict can
be found if the client's representation appears to be adversely affected by the lawyer's
other interests. See id. at 489 (citing Cmt, Utah R.Prof. Conduct 1.7). The court found
dispositive that if defense counsel has an interest in the facts of the case, "it may be
difficult or impossible for the lawyer to give a client detached advice." Id.
Johnson also addressed the actual conflict that can arise under Utah Rule of
Professional Conduct 8.4(d), which "addresses the institutional interest in ensuring that
just verdicts are rendered in criminal cases—an interest that may be jeopardized by the
existence of conflicts of interest." Id. at 489-90 (citing Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S.
153, 108 S.Ct 1692, 1697, 100 L.Ed 2d 140 (1988). Courts have an "interest in ensuring
that criminal trials are conducted within the ethical standards of the profession and that
legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them." Id. "It is professional
misconduct for a lawyer to.. .engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice." Id. (quoting Utah R.Prof. Conduct 8.4(d)). Irresponsible or improper conduct
by a lawyer that adversely affects the fairness of proceedings undermines the "public's
confidence in the bar" and erodes the legal process. Id. (citing United States v. Hobson,
672 F.2d 825, 828 (11th Cir. 1982) (finding actual conflict of interest where evidence of
defense counsel's own involvement in crime impugned credibility and integrity of
5

Rule 1.7(b) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct states in relevant part: "A lawyer
shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited
by.. .the lawyer's own interest, unless: (1) The lawyer reasonably believes the
representation will not be adversely affected; and (2) Each client consents after
consultation."
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counsel which would likely be detrimental to defendant), abrogated on other grounds by
Flanagan v. United States, 104 S.Ct. 1051, 1053,465 U.S. 259, 263, 79 L.Ed.2d 288, 288
(1984)). Thus, counsel's integrity and credibility personally, and as defense counsel,
were eroded by accusations, making him less effective in representing defendant.
Although Johnson and Hobson above had to do with defense counsel's own
personal involvement in the crime the defendant was charged with, divided loyalty can
also occur in less severe instances but when counsel avoids taking a position in one case
that would be embarrassing to him because of or in another. See e.g., State v. Brandley,
972 P.2d 78, 83. In dicta, the Brandley Court noted with support an English rule
allowing "barristers to accept [conflicting] cases that are not professionally
embarrassing...." Id. (quoting Peter W. Tague, Effective Advocacy for the Criminal
Petitioner. The Barrister vs. The Lawyer23 (1996)). Brandley also reiterates the rule set
forth above that to establish an actual conflict of interest defendants must show that trial
counsel "was required to make a choice advancing his own interests to the detriment of
his client's interests." 972 P.2d at 85 (citing Taylor, 947 P.2d at 686 (citations omitted)).
Hence, in summary of the above rules, presumed ineffective assistance of counsel
exists when there is an actual conflict of interest that adversely affected counsel's
performance. Brandley, 972 P.2d at 85. Such an actual conflict of interest exists where
counsel had to make a choice between his interests and his client's. Taylor, 947 P.2d at
686. It also exists where counsel is precluded from pursuing or avoids pursuing a
legitimate argument or defense for his client because he realizes taking such a position
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would be embarrassing. Brandley, at 83. The actual conflict arises where counsel made
the choice to advance his own interest of avoiding embarrassment to the detriment of his
client. Id. Furthermore, actual conflict exists where counsel's divided loyalty, be it
personal or professional loyalty to a third party (who can be a former client), creates a
situation of difficulty or impossibility for the lawyer to give his or her client detached
advice. See Johnson, 823 P.2d at 489 (citing Cmt, Utah R.Prof. Conduct 1.7). Finally,
an actual conflict of interest exists when counsel's choices are; so restricted that it is
prejudicial to administration of justice. See id. (citing Utah R.Prof.Conduct 8.4(d)).
However, although part of the analysis can include the consideration of whether
counsel's divided loyalty was detrimental to his client, this "detriment" does not have to
rise to the level of prejudice. See id. at 488. Prejudice is presumed. See id. Furthermore,
where Appellant's defense attorney, John Caine, had a conflict of interest that rendered
his assistance to Appellant ineffective. Morrison had brought on Caine as his advisor;
hence, any conflict of interest would be impugned on both counsel.
It is a legitimate trial strategy in sexual offense cases to pursue a defendant's
diagnosed mental illness or defect as a defense for inability to form the required mental
state element of a crime. See Utah Code Ann. §77-2-305(1 )(a) (2003). In State v.
Seale, the Utah Supreme Court held that trial counsel's "decision to assert an insanity
defense did not fall below the standard of reasonable professional assistance." 853 P.2d
862,868 (Utah 1993). It was a "legitimate exercise of professional judgment in the
choice of trial strategy" for Seale's counsel to invoke Section 77-2-305 and argue "that
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Seale had been mentally ill during the incidents of abuse." Id. at 867-8. The
reasonableness of this defense was based upon the fact that Seale had a history of
schizophrenia and severe depression and that "a hospital psychologist and a doctor
opined that Seale had been mentally ill during the time the alleged abuse occurred." Id.
at 868.
In the instant case, trial counsel avoided counseling his client on a legitimate
defense of diminished capacity to avoid personal embarrassment and threats to his
credibility where he would be forced to bring out testimony in Appellant's case that
contradicted Caine's personal position and legal position as advocate on a prior case.
c) Caine's Coercion of Peterson Despite a Good Chance of Acquittal and
the Breakdown of the Attorney-Client Relationship and Trust
Constituted an Actual Conflict of Interest that Adversely Affected
Counsel's Performance and was Hence Presumed Ineffective Assistance
of Counsel
Many courts have held that trial counsel's coercion of the defendant to enter a plea
of guilty or no contest despite the lack of strong evidence against the defendant
constitutes an actual conflict of interest where counsel's loyalty is divided between his
assisting prosecution and his duty to represent his client's best interests. See, e.g.,
Nebraska v. Bishop, 295 NW2d 698, 700-02 (Neb. 1980) (finding no conflict infringing
on the right to effective assistance where counsel "pressured" clients to entering plea of
guilty only because of overwhelming weight of evidence presented by prosecution); In re
Gay, 19 Cal.4* 771, 776-77. 968 P.2d 476,487-88 (Call 1998) (holding attorney's urging
and coercing his client to confess and stipulate to serial robberies without advising client
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of consequences thereof and where prosecution only had weak circumstantial evidence
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel).
[I]f an irreconcilable conflict exists between a client and his attorney, it is unlikely
that an atmosphere conducive to open communication between an attorney and client will
exist." White v. White, 602 F.Supp. 173, 176 (W.D.Mo. 1984). In support of this rule,
the court referred to American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice, stating
that "[n]othing is more fundamental to the lawyer-client relationship than the
establishment of trust and confidence." Id. (citing American Bar Association Standards
for Criminal Justice, Standard 4-3.1 (2d ed. 1982 Supp.)). "Defense counsel should seek
to establish a relationship of trust and confidence with the accused...." Id. "An attorney
has an actual.. .conflict of interest when, during the course of the representation, the
attorney's and defendant's interests 'diverge with respect to a material factual or legal
issue or to a course of action.'"

Winkler v. Keane, F.3d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1993)

(quoting Cuylerv. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 356 n. 3, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1722 n. 3, 64
L.Ed.2d 333 (1980) (J. Marshall, concurring in part, dissenting in part)).
False promises by counsel also contribute to the breakdown of the attorney-client
relationship and trust and constitute prima facie ineffective assistance of counsel. In
Moench v. State, the Utah Supreme Court mentioned in dicta that where a trial counsel
did not keep his promise to his client in a critical part of the proceedings, the attorney was
ineffective. 57 P.3d 1116, 1118 (Utah 2003). Moench asserted that he had entered a
guilty plea "because his counsel told him that he, the attorney, would later move the court
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to reduce his charges." Id. at 1118. His counsel failed to make such a motion. Id. With
this and the fact trial counsel had failed to object to sentencing based upon an outmoded
version of a statute, the court stated "Moench has made a prima facie claim that his
counsel was ineffective." Id. Although ruhng on whether the defendant could withdraw
his plea, not a claim of ineffective counsel, the Utah Court of Appeals has found a plea
coercive when a defendant pleads guilty based on "an exaggerated belief in the benefits
of his plea." State v. Norris, 2002 UT App 305,110, 57 P.3d 238, 241 (2002) (quoting
State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1276 (Utah 1988).
The presence of an actual conflict has been recognized when trial counsel urges
his client to enter a plea under duress. In Zeiszler v. Florida, the defendant alleged that at
the time he entered his plea, "he was under a great deal of emotional and mental distress
and believed he did not have a viable alternative." 765 So.2d 128, 129 (Fla.App. 1 Dist.
2000). The defendant asserted that "he had been coerced by defense counsel to enter the
plea" and that counsel had "insisted he take the plea. Id.
In factoring in whether trial counsel coerced a Petitioner, this Court should
consider such subjective factors as whether the defendant was subject to easy
manipulation by his counsel and whether counsel knew or should have known his client
was psychologically and emotionally vulnerable to outside influence. In cases
determining whether a confession is voluntary or coerced, Utah courts have considered
the defendant's "mental condition a more significant factor in the 'voluntariness'
calculus." State v. Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80, 984 P.2d 1009, 1014 (Utah 1999) (quoting
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Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d (1986)). The Utah
Supreme Court has thus set forth that in such an analysis of coercion under the totality of
circumstances analysis, "courts must also consider such factors as the defendant's mental
health, mental deficiency, emotional instability, education, age, and familiarity with the
judicial system." Rettenberger, 984 P.2d at 1014 (citing Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707,
712, 87 S.Ct. 1338, 18 L.Ed.2d 423 (1967) (education); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367
U.S. 568, 602-03, 81 S.Ct. 1860, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961) (mental deficiency); Spano v.
New York, 360 U.S. 315, 322, 79 S.Ct. 1202, 3 L.Ed.2d 1265 (1959) (emotional
instability); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 193, 77 S.Ct. 281, 1 L.Ed.2d 246 (1957)
(mental health)).
So long as the district court applied mental factors under a totality of the
circumstances analysis, the Utah Supreme Court approved of the district courts'
considering factors such as that the defendant: "(a) was suffering from A.D.D.; (b) had
the maturity level of a fifteen year-old; (c) had a below average I.Q.; (d) had fear of the
death penalty being imposed; and (e) was more susceptible to stress and coercion than the
average person." Rettenberger, 984 P.2d at 1014. The Court: also found dispositive the
fact that the persons who were allegedly behaving coercively toward the defendant knew
of defendant's mental vulnerability. Id.
Hence, in summary, an actual conflict exists where counsel coerces his client to
plea guilty when there is a good chance of acquittal. Coercion can be found when the
client is mentally vulnerable to persuasion and pressure by the attorney because of mental
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illness, low I.Q. or maturity, high susceptibility to stress, and feelings of duress.
Coercion can be found where the attorney prevails on the client his wishes of the client's
entering a plea where the client and the attorney have divergent interests or
disagreements with respect to a material factual or legal issue or to a course of action.
Finally, an actual conflict exists where false promises and other adversarial behavior by
counsel toward the client contribute to the breakdown of the attorney-client relationship
and trust. These all constitute prima facie ineffective assistance of counsel.
VII. CONCLUSION
Appellant seeks on order of this Court reversing the trial court's denial of his
Petition for Post-conviction Relief and thus thereby setting aside the trial court's
acceptance of the no-contest plea, vacating the conviction in Case No. 041902251, and
such further orders as will permit him a new trial. The Trial Court's acceptance of
Appellant's plea, which he unwillingly and unintelligently entered, was in violation of
Rule 11 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. Appellant's defense attorney, John Caine,
had a conflict of interest that rendered his assistance to Appellant ineffective. Morrison
had brought on Caine as his advisor; hence, any conflict of interest would be impugned
on both counsel. Caine pressured Appellant repeatedly knowing that Appellant was
emotionally and mentally vulnerable and that if Appellant went to trial eh would want to
put his character at issue. By putting his character at issue, Appellant would have to bring
up the abuse that Caine's former client caused Appellant and how that has made
Appellant even more sensitive than ever to children. For that reason, and for the other
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foregoing reasons, Mr. Peterson respectfully requests that the Trial Court's Order
denying his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief be reversed where the law, along with the
facts, as admitted, supports a holding that Mr. Peterson did not enter his plea intelligently
and voluntarily.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITED this 22 day of December, 2008.
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant
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This case is before the court on the remaining issues arising out of Petitioner's Petition for
Post-Conviction Relief. An evidentiary hearing on these issues was held before the court on
November 26, 2007 where all parties were represented by counsel. At the conclusion of the
evidence, the parties counsel agreed to submit their closing arguments in writing to the court
which the court has now reviewed.
Specifically, the remaining issues to be determined fall under two categories. The first is
whether defendant's plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered including whether there was
ineffective assistance of counsel. The second is whether petitioner received ineffective
assistance of counsel at the time he entered his plea due to a conflict of interest.
The background facts supporting the court's decision are as follows:
1. Petitioner was charged in Weber County with Aggravated Sexual Abuse of a Child a lsl
degree felony on or about April 22, 2004.
2. Petitioner was represented throughout the proceedings by attorneys John Caine, now
deceased, and William Morrison.
3. During this time petitioner was also charged in Davis County with a felony sex offense
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against a child.
4. The victim in the Davis County case was not the same victim as in Weber County.
5. John Caine and William Morrison represented petitioner in the Davis County case also.
6. Before petitioner was charged with these offenses, petitioner's son died while in the care of a
daycare center in either Weber or Davis County.
7. The operator of the daycare center, Ms. Daines, was charged with murder.
8. John Caine represented Ms. Daines in that case.
9. Ms. Daines was acquitted of the charge.
10. Petitioner and his family retained William Momson to represent petitioner in the sex crime
cases in both Davis and Weber Counties apparently because Mr. Morrison was also representing
petitioner and his family in a wrongful death civil case against Ms. Daines.
11. William Morrison suggested that the family retain John Caine to act as co-counsel for
petitioner in the criminal cases because he was impressed with Mr. Caine's ability as a criminal
defense attorney having spent a considerable time reviewing the record of Mr. Caine's
performance in the criminal case against Ms. Daines..
12. Mr. Morrison testified that he recognized that the petitioner may have some animosity
toward Mr. Caine because he represented Ms. Daines who had allegedly murdered petitioner's
son.
13. However, petitioner and his family agreed to have Mr. Caine act as co-counsel in this case
presumably because of Mr. Caine's excellent ability as a criminal defense attorney and in Mr.
Morrison's words "the family and Boyd were okay with it."
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14. After nearly a year and a half, petitioner entered a plea of no contest to Sexual Abuse of a
Minor a 2"d degree felony in Weber County.
15. In conjunction with that pica, counsel for the defense and the state approached the court
with a proposed agreement that in exchange for a no contest plea the court would impose
probation rather than a prison term and, if jail was imposed, the state would not object to work
release.
16. The court agreed that, absent some unexpected discovery in the presentence report revealing
other sex offenses, or the like, the court would go along with the sentencing recommendations as
outlined.
17. In conjunction with that, the court was adamant that the victim's family would have to agree
to the resolution.
18. The state assured the court that the family was agreeable with the recommendation and
specifically that the father of the victim was mainly concerned, at that point, that petitioner
(defendant) would plead to an offense that would require him to register with the Sex Offender
Registry.
19. There was never a suggestion that the victim's family would not allow the victim to testify if
the case proceeded to trial.
20. In both the Davis and Weber county cases, defendant consistently maintained that he was
innocent of the charges.
21. While the two criminal cases involved different victims, both had similar fact scenarios
alleged, specifically, that the victim was sitting on defendant's lap with other people in the area
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and that defendant placed his hand down the pants of the victim and fondled her private parts.

DECISION
The court has previously entered its decision on the issue regarding the probation violation.
The remaining issues addressed at the evidentiary hearing are:

1, Did petitioner enter his plea knowingly and voluntarily? As part of this issue petitioner
claims that the court conducted an inadequate plea colloquy which resulted in the failure of
petitioner to knowingly and voluntarily enter his plea. In addition petitioner claims that counsel
intimidated him into entering a plea instead of proceeding to trial. While not part of the original
petition, petitioner now alleges, in addition, that petitioner was incompetent to enter a plea, and
defense counsel was ineffective for failing to recognize the incompetence and request a
competency hearing..

2. Did petitioner's trial counsel have a conflict of interest that resulted in prejudice to the
petitioner? As part of this issue, petitioner claims that he had a mental infirmity defense that he
was not advised of as a result of the alleged conflict of interest, and petitioner was coerced into
pleading guilty by counsel not adequately explaining the consequences of the plea and by counsel
making derogatory remarks to petitioner.
The court gives its decision as follows and necessarily makes findings of fact based on the
evidentiary hearing which are incorporated herein.
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As to the first issue, the standard for determining whether a plea has been knowing and
voluntarily entered does not turn on whether there was a Rule 11 violation in taking the plea.
Petitioner's argument that the court did nol properly conduct a full Rule 11 colloquy with
petitioner is not a sufficient basis for granting post conviction relief. Rather the standard is
whether the defendant at the time he entered his plea did so, in fact, knowingly and voluntarily.
That is not to say that the events surrounding the taking of the plea, including the colloquy,
are not important in the context of determining whether the plea was voluntarily and knowingly
entered. However, if there was a Rule 11 violation, it is not presumptive that there was a
problem with the plea in this kind of proceeding.
In the instant case, at the plea hearing, the court determined that defense counsel, Mr. Caine,
read the statement in support of plea verbatim to the defendant. When the court asked defendant
whether he had read the plea statement, Mr. Caine informed the court that he had read it verbatim
line by line. At that time defendant is observed on the video tape nodding his head in agreement.
Tire court then asked defendant if he understood what was read to him. The defendant
acknowledged that he did in fact understand. The court acknowledged that the plea agreement
recited defendant's rights as well as stated the elements of the offense. The court then
summarized the rights included in the statement but did not go through all the rights enumerated
in Rule 11 since the plea agreement did that. The defendant was then asked if he wanted the
court to go through what was contained in the plea statement. Defendant said he did not and
once again acknowledged that he did in fact understand the contents of the plea statement. He
also acknowledges signing it. At a later point during the plea proceeding, the court asked Mr.
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Caine if he had any reason to think defendant didn't understand what was going on and Mr.
Caine responded: "Not at all."
Petitioner now asserts that Mr. Caine did not read the entire statement to him but rather
skipped over parts of it saying that certain parts were not applicable. Apparently at the time the
statement was read to petitioner, only Mr. Caine and petitioner were present. Petitioner claims
that his attorneys just told him that if he did what they told him to do that he'd be able to go
home to his family and it would be over. He testified at the post conviction evidentiary hearing
that he did not understand that he had a right to a trial and that he was presumed innocent. He
claims he did not understand what probation was; just that he would have to talk to cops and see
them at certain time. He also claims that Mr. Caine said there would be no jail.
Petitioner also claimed in the Davis County case, in his post conviction petition there, that the
plea statement was not read to him in that case. Mr. Morrison, the counsel who was primarily
handling the case in Davis County, testified at the post conviction hearing in Weber County that
he had in fact spent considerable time going over the statement with the defendant and had in fact
read it line by line to him.
Unfortunately, Mr. Caine was not available to testify since he died shortly before the post
conviction hearing in Weber County. That notwithstanding, given all the evidence presented to
the court, the court finds that petitioner's claim that the statement was not read to him is false.
He nodded when the court asked if the statement was read to him, he acknowledged to the court
twice that he understood the plea statement, he made the same false claim in Davis County, and
did not raise this issue until after he violated probation and was sent to prison. Mr. Caine
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affirmatively represented to the court, twice, that he had read the statement to petitioner.
Petitioner's claim that the statement was not read to him is simply not credible.
Defendant's claim that he did not understand that he had a right to a trial and that he had a
presumption of innocence is also not credible since the court specifically pointed out those rights
to defendant at the time of the plea. The court stated:

"You have a right to a trial in the case, a

right to have counsel cross examine all the witnesses that would be brought in against you. You
have a right to be present at trial when the witnesses testify against you. You have a right to a
jury trial, and that's what was scheduled in the case. You have a right not to testify at your trial,
and you're presumed innocent of the offense until proven otherwise, and a jury will be so
instructed." To this the defendant stated that he understood.
Petitioner's affidavit in support of his petition also shows that he understood the nature of the
proceedings. The affidavit states that he told his attorneys that he wanted to go to trial and call
witnesses including himself and his daughter to testify.
It can also be inferred from petitioner's actions and words that he understood the potential
penalties in the case. He readily interrupted the court at sentencing to ask that he be given work
release which demonstrates that lie anticipated going to jail. He certainly did not show any
surprise or outrage that he was going to jail rather than just being sent home to be with his family
as he claims he expected.
Petitioner cannot also now credibly claim that he was bullied into entering a plea by his
attorneys or the court. As the State cogently describes in their written closing argument:
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Petitioner's behavior at his court appearances belie his current attempt to
portray himself as a shy, manipulable follower. At the plea hearing, petitioner
was not looking to Mr.Caine for cues. Petitioner did not hesitate to answer the
Court's questions or indicate his agreement or answers by nodding his head. At
the plea hearing, as well as his other court appearances petitioner did not hesitate
to initiate conversations with his attorneys, to answer the Court's questions, or
even interrupt the Court and express concerns.

Petitioner's character and assertiveness is also demonstrated graphically in his taped sexually
explicit conversation with his minor niece which constituted the probation violation. His
questions, comments, and suggestiveness to his niece border on bullying and certainly do not
demonstrate a meek, easily manipulated, shy person. Quite the contrary.
The court also took a factual basis for the plea from the state. Because the defendant was
entering a no contest plea, the court asked the state to proffer what their evidence would be at the
time of trial. The state proffers that the victim would testify that "(the defendant) picked her up,
placed her on his lap, put his hand down the front of her pants on the bare skin, and touched her
genitals." The child was six years old. The defendant entered a no contest plea at which time the
court found that the plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered, and the state had offered
sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction in the case. The court went on to
acknowledge that there would be recommendations for fomial probation and not an initial prison
term, however, the court also informed defendant that if he violated probation any
recommendations for no prison would not come into play. Mr. Caine also stated the agreement
he had reached with the state for a recommendation to the court and acknowledged that if jail
time was imposed there would be a recommendation for work release.
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Based on the above, it is clear that the court properly incorporated the plea statement into the
record in support of defendant's plea of no contest and the plea statement had been read to
petitioner in its entirety and he signed it. Any claim that the plea was not knowingly and
voluntarily entered cannot be based on the failure of the court and counsel to advise petitioner of
his rights.
The next related issue is petitioner's claim that he was not competent to enter his plea, despite
his statements to the court that he understood what was going on, and that counsel was
ineffective for not recognizing this and asking for a competency hearing. This issue is more
factually complex and a determination of the validity of petitioner's claim hinges on a host of
factors.
The standard for determining incompetence to proceed is set forth in Utah Code. Ann. § 7715-2:

(A) person is incompetent to proceed if he is suffering from a mental disorder
or mental retardation resulting either in :
(1) his inability to have a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings
against him or of the punishment specified for the offense charged; or
(2) his inability to consult with his counsel and to participate in the
proceedings against him with a reasonable degree of rational understanding.
It is undisputed in this case that counsel did not request a competency hearing. It is also the
observation of this court that the judge did not note anything that would have triggered in her
mind a need for a competency hearing. At the time of the plea, defendant acknowledged that he
understood the plea statement which contained both a recitation of the elements of the offense,
the potential penalties, and the rights he was giving up by entering his plea. Counsel
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acknowledged at the time of the plea that there was no reason to think defendant did not
understand.
Significantly, Mr. Morrison testified at the post conviction hearing that he and Mr. Caine met
with defendant and his family members before the plea was entered where Mr. Caine outlined the
various options available to defendant by writing them out on a blackboard. The risks of
proceeding to trial were spelled out as was the possibility of life in prison if defendant was
convicted at trial. Mr. Morrison acknowledged that both he and Mr. Caine were willing to
proceed to a jury trial if defendant wanted that. Mr. Morrison also acknowledged that both he
and Mr. Caine strongly urged defendant to plead no contest to the lesser charge given that he had
a 50-50 chance of being found guilty at trial. Their advice, simply put, was that he would be a
"fool" to reject the plea bargain which earned with it a very lenient recommendation of probation
rather than prison. Mr. Morrison went on to state that he considered the plea bargain a "victory"
in light of the difficulty they would have overcoming a young victim's testimony at trial where
there was no motive to lie. Furthermore, the progress they had made in negotiating with the
prosecution was tremendous given that the State originally was unwilling to make any kind of
deal. Mr. Morrison also testified that if he were to counsel petitioner today his
advice would be the same-take the plea deal.
Mr. Morrison also testified that it was his observation that defendant understood the charge
and the potential penalties. Petitioner's characterization of Mr. Morrison's testimony and
demeanor as being defensive, self-protective, and lashing out is not accurate. The court does not
view Mr. Morrison's testimony that way at all. The court would characterize Mr. Morrison's
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testimony as objective and credible. Mr. Morrison testified that the only difficulty counsel had
with defendant was that defendant would become uncooperative when he was confronted with
either questions he did not want to answer or confronted with the limitations of options available
to him. For instance, defendant would act like he did not understand what they were saying when
confronted with the question of how the victim got on his lap in the first place. Since this was a
question that the State would "hammer on" at trial, as defense counsel they wanted to know how
to counter it, but, they simply could not get him to answer that question. Also when confronted
with the option of how he would plead, defendant would keep asking why he had to do anything.
It was counsel's impression that when the defendant did not like the question asked or was
confronted with options he was unwilling to choose from he would become recalcitrant. Ii was at
those times that Mr. Morrison acknowledged counsel would become frustrated with defendant,
although he does not recall any time that names were called.
Mr. Morrison further testified that he simply did not see any signs that defendant suffered
from a diminished capacity or incompetence. Mr. Morrison further noted that defendant
graduated from high school and held a job at Hill Air Force Base paying $23.00 per hour. While
defendant was "slow" Mr. Morrison testified that they did not feel they could meet the significant
burden of showing a diminished capacity and that issue was discussed between counsel.

In short, based on Mr. Morrison's testimony, it is clear to the court that counsel noted that
defendant was somewhat slow but that his capacity did not rise to the level of diminished
capacity in a legal sense. Counsel concluded that while defendant could be recalcitrant in areas
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that he did not want to address or acknowledge, he understood the charge and penalties
associated with it.
There is a great deal of other evidence which corroborates Mr. Morrison's observations and
conclusions. Those will be listed as follows:

1. Neither petitioner nor petitioner's family ever told the court or counsel that petitioner was
incapable of understanding or that he did not understand not until petitioner had been sentenced
to prison on the probation violation that is.

2. In May of 2004 prior to the plea, Dr. Rick Hawks conducted a Psychological, Sexual
Behavioral, and Risk Assessment of petitioner which consisted of a test including 2000 questions
which petitioner was able to complete. The results showed that petitioner was "faking good"
meaning that he was dissimulating-attempting to make himself look better than he was,
minimizing, and otherwise not accurately answering all the questions to reflect his true state.
This conduct is similar to that which Mr. Morrison observed and which is described above. The
tests administered also contain an internal component which allow a check to determine whether
someone doesn't understand or is just randomly answering questions. The results showed that
petitioner understood the test and the questions. Although the examination done by Dr. Hawks
was not performed to determine competency the fact that petitioner was able to complete the
exam shows a minimal level of competency. It should be noted however that the testing also
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showed that petitioner had a low 1Q falling in the borderline range.

3. In the presentence report prepared after petitioner entered his no contest plea, petitioner's
written statement makes it clear that petitioner knew what he was charged with. In his own
words he states as follows:
"(The victim's) claim is that I put her on my lap and put my hands down inside
her levis, and fondled her. It would be very difficult to put anyone's hands in side
a childs pants while they are sitting on your lap with out having the pants
unbuttoned and unzipped. Especially with a child and my large hands. My
feelings about this is that it did not happen."
Petitioner's counsel insinuates in closing argument that because the statement was typed, and,
petitioner was likely not capable of typing it, that the statement is not his own. The problem with
this argument is that petitioner specifically stated at the hearing that the statement was in fact his
own. Clearly, petitioner identifies the essential elements of the offense he was charged with and
even articulates a defense of impossibility to the charge.

4. Attached to the presentence report are two letters from petitioner's employer which state the
following:

"Mr. Boyd Peterson has proven to be a valuable asset to the Airborne Generator
Flight mission in support of the United States Air Force. Working as a contractor
for several years within our organization, his professionalism and dedication was
recognized with his selection as a full-time Government employee in February
2005. He continues to display those same attributes on a daily basis and we feel
very fortunate to have him as a valued member of our Air Force Team."
(Undated, signed by William M. Tews, Flight Chief, Airborne Generators)
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A second letter of recommendation stales:
"I've had the opportunity to work with Mr. Boyd Peterson for the past two years.
During that time Boyd has proven to be an excellent employee. He is timely,
reliable and completes any work assigned in a professional manner. He works
well with his peers and has had no disciplinary action taken against him."
(Undated, signed by Larry D. Ballard, Flight Chief, Ground Powers System)

Both of these letters do not comment on an individual who is incapable of understanding things.
They are inconsistent with petitioner's claims now that "I don't understand what people tell me"
or that he is mentally retarded.

5. Also attached to the presentence report are a series of letters from petitioner's family that
reflect that petitioner understood his options and made a reasoned choice to enter a no contest
plea. Nowhere in those communications do family members express their concern that petitioner
didn't understand what he was doing. Excerpts from those letters are as follows:

Letter from Gail and Earl Peterson (mother and father):
"Boyd's attorney said there is a 50-50 chance of losing this case, and Boyd chose
to take a plea rather than a chance of leaving his family and going to prison."

Letter from Michael Peterson (brother):
"Taking a plea was the best of two choices for his family. Having to have his
oldest daughter testify in court ... after all she has suffered in her young life, he
really felt the choice was to prevent any further pain to her. Therefore he took a
plea. This was a hard decision but knowing the trauma it would cause for her
having to be in court again was more than he could endure or have her face."
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6. The court handed down petitioner's sentence on the no contest plea consistent with what it
had indicated it would do-suspended prison with a jail sentence and work release along with
formal probation. Neither petitioner nor his family raised the issue that petitioner didn't
understand what he had plead to nor did they raise an issue that he thought he was simply going
to be able to go home to his family rather than go to jail.

7. The first indication to the court that petitioner was claiming a problem with the manner in
which his plea was taken was after his probation was revoked and he was sent to prison for
violating the terms of his probation specifically by making a sexually explicit phone call to his
underage niece from the jail. A letter petitioner wrote to his mother (Exhibit 22) although
undated indicates that "I did not understand what no contest meant." That letter was written by
petitioner while he was in prison, long after the entry of his plea.

8. While in the jail awaiting sentencing on his probation violation, Dr. Rick Hawkes was asked
to visit him to review mental health issues. Petitioner reported at that time that he was having a
total mental breakdown, that he couldn't think straight, and that he didn't even know who he
was. The jail according to Dr. Hawkes was not treating petitioner as having a serious mental
breakdown, and it was Dr. Hawkes observation that this was not a true mental breakdown.
Rather, petitioner was saying things such as: "I'll do whatever J can to get out" and "If I don't get
out I'll kill myself." Dr. Hawkes interpreted these threats as simply efforts to manipulate his
surroundings.
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The evidence presented at the postconviction hearing in support of petitioner's claims of
incompetence consisted of testimony from family members who stated they did not think
petitioner underslood what was going on, even though they never told anyone including the court
this, and a psychologist, Dr. Victoria Burgess who examined petitioner over a year after he
entered his plea. The family members' testimony is not consistent with the letters sent to the
court in connection with the presentence report quoted above. In those letters they clearly
understood and reflected that petitioner understood that by taking the plea he was choosing
between the lesser of two evils, by avoiding a prison sentence initially anyway.

Even their

testimony regarding petitioner asking the same questions over and over again is consistent with
Mr. Morrison's observations that petitioner repeatedly asked why he had to do anything despite
their telling him repeatedly what his options were. Mr. Morrison's conclusion was that petitioner
was avoiding the inevitable and avoiding reality by repeating the questions. He simply did not
want to understand because he did not like his choices. Ultimately, however, he did make a
choice to plead no contest; a choice that was described in the family letters above.
As for Dr. Burgess1 testimony and report, the court notes that the standard she applied for
incompetence really does not meet the statutory standard quoted at the outset of this decision.
Dr. Burgess concludes that petitioner would "have some difficulty disclosing pertinent facts,
events and states of mind. He would have an extremely difficult time comprehending and
appreciating the range and nature of possible penalties that may be imposed in the proceedings
against him and engaging in reasoned choice of legal strategies and options. Therefore, Boyd
Peterson was not competent to enter a plea of no contest. It is all best summed up in Boyd
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Peterson's own words, '1 did not want to go to jail and 1 wanted to return to my family. 1 listen to
people because they are smarter than me.'"
The legal standard is not that someone would have difficulty with the tasks identified above
but that they are unable to do them. Furthermore, Dr. Burgess did not review the videotape of
the plea nor did she consult with petitioner's counsel, both important sources of information as to
petitioner's state of mind at the time he entered his plea. Instead Dr. Burgess talked with
petitioner's mother, administered some basic psychological tests, and appears to have relied
primarily on petitioner's own self serving assessment. Petitioner's mantra at the post conviction
relief hearing was " 1 just don't understand what people tell me." That statement is plainly
disingenuous. Taken at face value it may appear to support a conclusion that petitioner was
incompetent to enter a plea, and his attorneys should have recognized it. The problem is that it
not true. This was a grown man, albeit with a low IQ ,who had and supported a family, held a
good paying job at Hill Air Force Base, was buying a home, was able to drive a car and
presumably pass a driver's test, and who functioned day to day in an apparently adequate, nomial
way. He gave no indication to the court that he was incompetent. His attorneys apparently did
not recognize any signs that he was incompetent. A low IQ and even mental retardation do not
automatically result in an assessment of incompetence. The totality of the circumstances and
observations of everyone involved at the time of his plea lead to an opposite conclusion.

Given

all these factors, it cannot be said that petitioner's counsel was ineffective for not asking for a
competency hearing.
The second issue concerns whether petitioner's counsel Mr. Caine had a conflict of interest.
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The standard for determining whether counsel had a conflict of interest is that the conflict must
be actual and must have negatively affected counsel's performance in such a way that counsel
sought to advance his own interests rather than his client's. State v. Lovell 984 P.2d 382 (Utah
1999).
In the instant case, Mr. Caine, one of petitioner's attorneys, had previously represented Ms.
Daines who was charged with murdering petitioner's son while he was in her care. That person
was acquitted of the charge. Mr. Morrison testified that petitioner and his family agreed to have
Mr. Caine act as co-counsel and represent petitioner in this case.

Therefore, petitioner waived

any conflict of interest claim.
Secondly, there does not appear to be any actual conflict of interest. As Mr. Morrison
testified, they were two unrelated cases.
Even assuming that there may have been a conflict of interest, there is no showing that Mr.
Caine acted in a way that adversely affect petitioner in his representation. Petitioner claims that
Mr. Came would not have been willing to allow him to testify that he never would have been
able to hurt a child because his own son had been murdered because Mr. Caine still had a loyalty
to Ms. Daines who he supposedly believed was innocent. The problem with this argument is that
il simply does not follow that Mr. Caine's defense of Ms. Daines would have precluded him from
presenting testimony in petitioner's case that petitioner was depressed at his son's death and held
the belief that his son had been murdered. Furthermore, it would not have precluded petitioner
from testifying that this condition would prevent petitioner from hurting a child. The connection
that petitioner is trying to make between the two cases is a non sequitur.
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While petitioner's counsel may have discouraged him from testifying, Mr. Morrison pointed
out that the reason was not due to Mr. Caine's representation of Ms. Dairies, but rather stemmed
from the concern that the Davis County case pending against petitioner may have become
relevant in the instant case if the character defense was raised. Specifically, raising this kind of
character defense could have opened the door to evidence of the details of the Davis County case
which was strikingly similar to the instant one. As Mr. Morrison testified, if evidence of the
Davis County case would have been allowed into evidence because of the character defense
petitioner claims he wanted to raise, the result would have been devastating to petitioner's
credibility in front of a jury.
As far as Mr. Caine's alleged conflict because of a reluctance to assert a diminished capacity
or insanity defense, Mr. Morrison testified that they, as petitioner's counsel, did explore this
possibility but felt that it did not have viability. Furthermore, as the State points out, the defense
assumes that the alleged conduct occurred, something that petitioner has consistently denied.
In sum, petitioner has not met his burden of showing a conflict of interest. Even if one were
to find a conflict, however, it cannot be reasonably said to have affected counsel's performance.
Instead, Mr. Caine negotiated a very favorable plea agreement, approved by the court in advance,
which virtually guaranteed probation and avoided a very real potential of a life sentence in
prison.
Furthermore, the credibility of petitioner and his family who testified is severely
compromised. Petitioner is desperate to be released from prison after his serious probation
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violation landed him there, lie docs not want to be in jail or prison and, as he stated in March of
2006, he would do anything to get out. Petitioner's family is also desperate to see petitioner
released. They have supported petitioner from the beginning of the case, even denying the
serious nature of petitioner's probation violation which victimized petitioner's brother's own
minor daughter and his mother's granddaughter. Even to this day they continue to characterize
the sexual deviance of petitioner in the probation violation as a "joke" or an attempt to make the
young lady feel pretty. They are in serious denial as is the petitioner.
The Petition for Post Conviction release is denied. That State will review its proposed
Findings of Fact and include any portions of this opinion that are not included.

JLOO?

DATED this

day of]

PAMELA G. HEFFEKNAN
District Court Judge
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